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Epistemic Poverty, Internalism, and Justified Belief: A Response to Robert Lockie1 




In his recent Social Epistemology article “Perspectivism, 
Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty” Robert Lockie aims to disarm 
the so-called “epistemic poverty objection” to the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). I first offer a 
regimentation of that objection, inspired by Laurence BonJour. I then 
turn to examining Lockie’s counter-arguments. As it turns out, rather 
than addressing directly conceptual issues within epistemology, 
Lockie’s main efforts go into arguing that generally epistemic subjects 
from outside contemporary advanced communities are not as poverty-
stricken, as some modern epistemologists may have thought. I review 
Lockie’s arguments to that conclusion as well as alternative ways of 
arguing for a similar point, and conclude that they do not decisively 
undermine the poverty objection. I then turn to Lockie’s argument that 
a suitable version of epistemic access-internalism may successfully 
counter the poverty objection. I here conclude that the version of 
access-internalism Lockie needs is non-standard as well as 
implausible. The upshot is that even if Lockie’s article has brought 
several interesting and original concerns to bear on the debate over 
DCEJ, he has not defeated the poverty objection.   
 
The Epistemic Poverty Objection  
 
The epistemic poverty objection, in its recent form, was developed by Laurence 
BonJour (even if arguably the underlying idea is much older).2 In 2002 BonJour 
wrote: 
  
It is certainly possible that a person’s epistemic situation, the kinds of 
cognitive tools and methods of inquiry available to him or her, might 
be so dire and impoverished (as a result of either individual or cultural 
deficiencies) as to make it difficult or impossible to come up with 
strong evidence or good epistemic reasons for belief about many 
important matters.3  
																																								 																				
1 I am grateful to Jim Collier for the opportunity to write this response. Warm thanks extend to Rik 
Peels for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.    
2 E.g. already Roderick Firth’s incisive objections against Chisholm’s version of DCEJ came at least 
very close to the core of of BonJour’s poverty objection, e.g when Firth insists that “it is, in short, an 
open question- not to be closed by definition—whether it is reasonable, in this ethical sense, to accept a 
proposition which is improbable”. Firth 1959, 498. Firth’s objection against DCEJ here in a sense is the 
inverse of the poverty objection: It is that immediately (“by definition”) DCEJ renders all epistemically 
reasonable (“probable”) beliefs blameless (“ethically reasonable”). But it is only a small step to see a 
problem of similar magnitude in the fact that immediately DCEJ renders all blameless beliefs 
epistemically reasonable without taking into account their objective epistemic quality. And implicitly, 
Firth seems to take this step: At least he talks of epistemic reasons in objectivist terms and explicitly 
regards it a problem that Chisholm cannot informatively say that some subject is blameless for holding 
a belief, because she has adequate evidence for it, since to him the purported explanans here is simply 
the explanandum stated once over (1959, 496).         




Shortly after this passage, BonJour passes the following diagnosis:  
 
Cases of epistemic poverty are cases in which it seems possible to 
fulfill one’s epistemic duty without being epistemically justified.4     
                     
It follows that any conception of epistemic justification (EJ) committed to the falsity 
of that modal claim must itself be false. But according to BonJour, the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ) is thus committed: “The central claim of 
the deontological conception of [epistemic] justification is that satisfying one’s 
intellectual duty or responsibility in relation to the acceptance of a particular belief is 
both necessary and sufficient for that belief to be epistemically justified.” 5 So, in 
virtue of its sufficiency claim, DCEJ must be false. This, in short, is the poverty 
objection to DCEJ. 
 
Before we may begin to assess BonJour’s argument in detail, clarifications seem 
needed. E.g. how much, in the relevant context, need we say about contentious 
notions such as “good epistemic reasons” and “intellectual duty”? Concerning the first 
term, I propose that at least initially we follow BonJour’s lead and unpack this notion 
in terms of truth conduciveness. In BonJour’s preferred words, good epistemic 
reasons offer a relevant subject “at least some chance of finding the truth”.6  As we 
shall soon, this seems precise enough for our present purposes. 
 
Relative to a proposition p and a subject S, I suggest we take an epistemic reason to 
be something (a perceptual episode etc.) indicating to S either that p is true or 
indicating to S that p is false. Following BonJour’s lead, relative to a situation, we 
may then take a good epistemic reason for S to believe/disbelieve p to be an epistemic 
reason, such that, should S in that situation come to believe what the epistemic reason 
indicates, S would then have a fairly high chance of believing the truth concerning p.   
What exactly constitutes a sufficiently high chance or even “some” chance, luckily we 
may leave vague here. All that matters, as we shall soon see, is that at least 
sometimes, for some possible configurations of a subject, a proposition, and a 
situation, plausibly no good epistemic reasons are available, yet belief or disbelief is 
nevertheless irresistible.  
 
This last claim is a psychological one. Yet, it is easily underpinned by philosophical 
considerations naturally falling out of the suggested framework: The above 
conception of a good epistemic reason allows us to enforce an appearance-reality 
distinction and separate epistemic reasons that are really good (relative to a subject 
and a situation) from those that are only apparently so. The only bit of proper 
empirical psychology we need now add to the mix is the seemingly plausible thesis 
that sometimes subjects cannot help forming beliefs based on what appears to them to 
be good epistemic reasons, even if those reasons are not really good ones.     
 
If we allow the proponent of the poverty objection this thesis, it is clear that her 
commitments regarding the extent and nature of “intellectual duty” need not extend 
beyond the minimal. All she needs is the normative principle that (dutifully) ought 
																																								 																				
4 BonJour 2002, 237. 
5 BonJour 2002, 236. 
6 BonJour 2002, 237. 
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implies (psychologically) can, together with the plausible empirical thesis that in 
some scenarios some subjects psychologically could not have brought themselves in a 
position to discover that certain epistemic reasons, which to them appear to be good 
ones, are in fact no good. No matter the full extent of our “intellectual duty”, since it 
is some kind of duty, it then follows that it cannot involve resisting belief under such 
circumstances.              
 
We may now reconstruct a Bonjour-style poverty objection to the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification as follows: 
 
1. In order for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing a 
proposition p in some situation C, S’s belief that p must be supported 
by good epistemic reasons for S to believe p in C; 
 
2. [BonJour-style understanding of epistemic reason-goodness] In 
order for a reason to be a good epistemic reason for S to believe p in 
C, in C S must have a fairly high chance of believing the truth 
concerning p, should she believe as the reason indicates;7 
 
3. [Appearance-reality distinction] It is possible for an epistemic 
reason to appear very good to a subject in a situation, even if here it is 
not really a good epistemic reason; 
 
4. There are possible situations and subjects, such that here a subject 
psychologically could not have brought herself not to believe what is 
indicated by reasons that appear to her to be good epistemic reasons, 
even if really believing by those reasons does not here offer the subject 
a fairly high chance of believing the truth concerning p; 
 
5. [Ought implies can] If a subject S psychologically could not have 
brought it about that X, S has not violated her intellectual duty by 
failing to bring it about that X; 
 
6. ERGO: There are possible situations and subjects, such that here a 
subject is not epistemically justified in believing a proposition p, even 
if she has not violated her intellectual duty by failing not to believe p 
(from 1-5); 
 
7. ERGO: Any theory of epistemic justification implying that 
necessarily, if a subject has not violated her intellectual duty by 
believing p, she is thereby justified in believing p, is false (from 6).   
 
Before proceeding to Lockie’s counter-arguments, let us briefly take stock of the 
dialectical situation: 
 
The argument above is logically valid. It derives its conclusion (7) on the basis of 
assumptions (1)-(5). (1) seems impregnable in this context, even if it denied by certain 
																																								 																				
7 Remark that (2) need only spell out a necessary requirement, not a sufficient one. Hence it does not 
matter whether a sufficient condition for epistemic reason-goodness should involve the further 
requirement that the relevant belief is also psychologically based on such reasons.    
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theories of EJ, such as “mad dog” process reliabilism8.  Still, it seems hard to find a 
theory of EJ hospitable to the negation of (7), which also clearly undermines (1).  
After all, it sounds highly odd to say that a particular belief does not breach any 
intellectual duties, is epistemically justified, but is nonetheless in no legitimate sense 
epistemically reasonable.9 It arguably makes much more sense for the champion of 
DCEJ to fight over the proper understanding of epistemic reasonableness in the 
context of the poverty argument, thus targeting (2) and (3). We shall return to this 
matter later below.  
 
(4) also appears to be fairly uncontroversial. This premise is supported by strong 
empirical evidence, e.g. concerning the effects of what Alston termed “cultural 
isolation”.10 Alston here offers the stock example of a native, who, along with his 
peers, unhesitatingly adopts the cosmological beliefs central to the traditions of their 
tribe. Never has the native subject had any chance to encounter counter-evidence, and 
the relevant beliefs are passed on by the most respected local authorities with 
overwhelming force. Cartesian skeptical ideals notwithstanding, it seems highly 
plausible that in such situations a subject has no psychological possibility but to 
believe the traditional tribal wisdom, even if his reasons here do not offer him 
anywhere near a high chance of believing the truth about cosmological matters.   
 
It is no conclusive objection here that many cosmological myths probably are not 
interpreted too literally by the communities to which they are central, or that typical 
affirmative attitudes towards them perhaps do not clearly fit into the extension of the 
English term “belief”.11 Surely it is hard to deny that at least some members of 
traditional isolated communities have clearly and irresistibly believed select 
cosmological propositions on the basis of non-truth-conducive reasons; say the 
proposition that starlight derives from small holes in a semi-spherical canopy 
spanning the surface of their world.    
 
The ought-implies can principle embedded in (5) also does not seem like the most 
obvious place to begin attacking the poverty objection. Surely, in an epistemological 
context an unrestricted principle of this sort has come under fire from various 
quarters12. Yet, it should be clear that really the argument could go through even on a 
much weaker version of the fifth premise: It suffices, if in at least some of the possible 
doxastic situations verifying (4), the subject is off the hook because she could not 
have believed otherwise. Denying this seems a very steep price to pay for the 
defender of DCEJ. After all, it seems highly plausible that at least sometimes the fact 
that a subject could not in any way have brought about a different doxastic outcome 
																																								 																				
8 See here not least Goldman 1979, according to which production of a belief by a reliable process 
suffices for its EJ (given the satisfaction of some further counterfactual conditions). Of course even this 
position is at least consistent with the  thesis that no process is reliable unless it involves support by 
good epistemic reasons.   
9 Anyway, Lockie seems to concede (1): He uses the terms “epistemically justified” and “epistemically 
rational/reasonable” more or less interchangeably. And traditional champions of DCEJ like Chisholm 
did not shy away from construing justification in terms of reasonableness. See e.g. Firth 1959. 
10 Alston 1989, 145. 
11 Famously, Needham 1972 makes much of such claims. 
12 See not least Owens 2000. 
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suffices to get her off the hook. Not least if we interpret the last status as her simply 
not being an appropriate target of blame13 on account of the actual outcome. 
 
Given the above examination of the poverty objection, it would seem that the 
defender of DCEJ is well advised to direct her fire against (2) and (3). But (3) seems 
highly natural, once (2) is in place. So the defender of DCEJ faces the principal task 
of arguing against (2). Yet, clearly (2) could be undermined by a direct attack on (3): 
If there is no legitimate distinction between epistemic reasons that are really good and 
epistemic reasons that (perhaps with certain qualifications) appear good to a subject, 
of course this undercuts any motivation for a view of epistemic reasonableness that 
irresistibly suggests such a distinction. But denying (3), on the face of it, amounts to a 
very radical epistemic subjectivism. The difficult project, now, is formulating this 
subjectivist position and supporting it adequately, without simply begging the 
question against the poverty objection. Of course, if (7) if false, DCEJ is true. This 
may perhaps lend support to some form of epistemic subjectivism (we shall return to 
this matter further below). Yet, supporting (3) by virtue of denying (7), would simply 
beg the question against the poverty objection. 
 
Above, I have made an effort carefully to formulate the poverty objection to DCEJ in 
a form faithful to Lockie’s principal sources. Ensuingly, I have quickly diagnosed the 
strengths of that objection. This footwork I deem required for a fair assessment of 
Lockie’s arguments, since no similar regimentation occurs in his article and it would 
otherwise seem very hard to estimate the relevance and force of his specific attacks. 
At last, we may now devote our full attention to Lockie’s text. 
 
Lockie Against Epistemic Poverty 
 
Much of Lockie’s text is devoted to attacking ascriptions of massive epistemic 
poverty, not least such as are arguably informed by cultural bias: Contrary to the 
opinions of certain bigots, according to Lockie 
 
… we should see rationality (and irrationality) as a species-specific 
human capability, potentially attainable by all—or nearly all. I hold 
that rationality is not situated in one arbitrarily specific way-station 
located between a humanly unbounded God’s-eye reification and the 
perspective of our ancestors living in caves: a specific way-station to 
be found currently only in a micro-thin stratum of the 
statistically/logically educated élite.14 
 
Lockie offers at least two basic lines of argument to support the above claim (I hope 
not to have missed further important arguments in his text). His positive argument, 
very briefly unfolded in the text, is empirical and appeals to the fact that even cultures 
steeped in irrationality to the bigot Western eye have in fact prospered and survived; 
together with the implicit premise that epistemic rationality is a precondition of such 
survival and prospering: 
 
																																								 																				
13 The relations between notions such as ”duty”, ”blame”, and ”permission” in a doxastic context 
arguably are complex. I have no space for a detailed treatment of such matters here. A reader interested 
in my views may consult Nottelmann 2007. See also Nottelmann 2013.   
14 Lockie 2015,12. 
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Highly contextualized humans … faced and face enormously complex, 
open-ended challenges across a great range of startlingly different 
situations: challenges involving frequent life-and-death situations in 
the harshest of environments. The idea that after surviving such 
challenges to adulthood, they were and are not, as a population, 
rational; or at least not as rational as us in contemplating our 
supermarket and smart-phone decisions, is on the face of it, not an 
attractive position to have to defend.15    
                  
I deem Lockie’s empirical-historical line of attack here to be somewhat at odds with 
his over-all purposes: Surely some cultures have impressively survived under very 
harsh conditions. But if we take this as solid evidence of their being “as a population” 
at least as rational as us modern scientifically literate Westerners, what should we say 
about those cultures, which like The Roman Empire, arguably have managed to fall 
into decline and perish even under conditions of relative plenty? For the present 
purposes, however, let us ignore this point and simply grant Lockie that even people 
entirely unable to appreciate modern statistics and logic (such as emblematic 
“illiterate agrarian peasants”16) do in fact base very many of their important decisions 
on epistemically rational assumptions.  
 
We may also grant him that this is important to their collective survival. It remains 
hard to see how this offers support to the deontological conception of epistemic 
justification (DCEJ). Rather the relevant line of thought seems congenial to the 
appearance-reality distinction, which the poverty objection needs for its premise (3): 
Surely it cannot have much survival value for people living under harsh conditions 
merely to base their decisions on reasons, which to them seem truth-conducive, but 
really are not: A community, which in frequent cases of drought invariably sacrifice 
their best live stock to the Earth Goddess, because this seems to them a reliable way 
of securing relief from famine, is threatened on its existence, unless this procedure is 
somehow really a reliable way of promoting its survival.  
 
So far the poverty objection is only further bolstered. But does Lockie’s above 
observation undermine other of its key assumptions, then? I think not. Of course 
progress is made with bereaving premise (4) of some of the evidence apparently 
supporting it: At least this premise is not immediately verified by observations of the 
ways of actual “illiterate peasants” as some bigots would perhaps think. Yet, as was 
already brought out above, still the premise seems overwhelmingly plausible. As 
Lockie concedes earlier in his article, “people are, after all, quite often irrational”.17 
And this clearly holds, even if rationality is more or less evenly distributed among 
literate and illiterate communities, as Lockie (perhaps too quickly) seems to conclude. 
As long as we accept the appearance-reality distinction for epistemic rationality, it 
seems safe to maintain that—even in the best of communities—some people do not 
believe as rationally as they think they do. And for such cases the poverty objection 
remains in full force.            
 
Lockie’s positive attack on epistemic poverty, then, offered little ammunition against 
the poverty objection. However, he also launches a negative defense, claiming that 
																																								 																				
15 Lockie 2015,12. 
16 This is Lockie’s term (2015,12). 
17 Lockie 2015, 9. 
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some methods for evaluating the epistemic rationality of people in non-Western 
societies are in fact deeply unfair. Lockie here reviews Alexander Luria and Lev 
Vygotsky’s famous 1930’s investigations into the logical acumen of illiterate Uzbek 
peasants. Here test subjects were orally presented with the following puzzle: 
 
In the far north, where it snows, the bears are white; 
 
Nova Zemblya is in the far north, and it is always snowy there; 
 
What color are the bears in Nova Zemblya?18 
 
Many test subjects failed to deliver the response “white”. Rather they refused to 
answer the final question, quoting insufficient information or their lack of authority 
on the matter.  
 
I entirely share Lockie’s central verdict that such test results are very poor evidence of 
widespread Uzbek peasant irrationality. I also think that the case is relatively clear: A 
crucial reasonable (or at least not clearly unreasonable) belief attributable to the 
typical Uzbek peasant here, is the belief that still they were not in a position 
appropriately to pronounce on the color of the Nova Zemblya bears to a distinguished 
audience like the official Soviet academics (or something like it).19 A belief in this 
vicinity would seem to account very well for their verbal behavior. Unfamiliar with 
academic logic puzzles and their associated language games, they could hardly be 
faulted for their failure to appreciate that the test question was really supposed to be 
heard as a disguised conditional of the form: If the above dual assumptions are true, 
what are you then in a position to conclude about the Nova Zemblya bears?     
      
But also I see no consequences of this for our conception of epistemic rationality. 
Marking an illiterate Uzbek as irrational on the basis of his refusal to perform in the 
Soviet logic test seems very much like faulting a gorilla for physical weakness, 
because it shows unwillingness to enter an Olympic weightlifting competition. Even 
after the test, the possibility remained live that the Uzbeks were rational in their 
beliefs in exactly the same sense as typical Western intellectuals often credit 
themselves with being. And general empirical reasons would suggest that probably 
the typical Uzbek peasant would prove fairly competent with basic logical deduction 
in settings closer to home, such as planning his harvest or negotiating trading prices 
for his crops at the market. Just as even after a gorilla’s failure to enter a weightlifting 
competition, observations of its physiology and living conditions suggest that it is 
very physically strong in exactly the same sense as are elite human weightlifters, 
including the ability to lift heavy objects over the top of its head. 
 
Lockie’s empirical arguments against widespread epistemic poverty, even if 
successful, arguably should not trouble proponents of the poverty objection much. But 
perhaps it is too early to give up on Lockie’s general strategy here. It still could well 
																																								 																				
18 Quoted from Lockie 2015, 5. 
19 Here, on Lockie’s behalf, I try to meet Rik Peels’ complaint that Lockie does not sufficiently 
articulate the Uzbek beliefs, which are not proved irrational by the test. Peels 2015, 45. Peels offer an 
insightful analysis of Luria’s and Vygotsky’s specific findings. I shall not engage with those here, since 
arguably even an interpretation most congenial to Lockie’s purposes does not seem to offer him the 
desired ammunition against the poverty objection.    
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be that more principled reasons against widespread epistemic poverty offer more 
comfort to DCEJ. One strategy could be an argument based on fundamental 
hermeneutical principles. Such an argument could gain momentum from Donald 
Davidson’s insistence that “we have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in 
the interpretation of [natural] language”20 together with his famous holistic theory of 
the conditions for such an interpretation. The argument could go like this: 
 
8. In order to evaluate the justification for subject S’s belief, we need 
to attribute to her (fairly) definite belief contents; 
 
9. [Davidsonian Principle] We cannot attribute to S (fairly) definite 
belief contents, unless we are in possession of an interpretation of her 
language; 
 
10. [Principle of Charity] We cannot acquire an interpretation of S’s 
language, unless we attribute to most of her utterances truth and 
sincerity; 21  
 
11. We cannot attribute truth and sincerity to most of S’s utterances, 
unless we assume that most of her beliefs are true;   
 
12. We cannot assume that most of S’s beliefs are true, unless we 
assume that most of S’s beliefs are epistemically reasonable; 
 
13. ERGO: Before we may even begin to evaluate the epistemic 
justification of S’s beliefs, we must assume that most of her beliefs are 
epistemically reasonable. Any assumption involving S’s whole-sale 
epistemic poverty is simply incoherent (from 8-12). 
 
Several controversial twists and turns were taken in this argument, which I have no 
space to discuss here. However, by endorsing the argument, the opponent of the 
poverty objection is offered some interesting moves. As was the case with Lockie’s 
outspoken empirical argument, the most natural reading of “epistemically reasonable” 
here is not a subjectivist one. Rather the assumption of massive truth in S’s belief-
base seems to enforce an assumption of objective reliability in her belief-forming 
ways. Still the argument offers the deontologist a promising way to at least cull the 
appearance-reality distinction (3), and hence limit the impact of the poverty argument, 
without going fully subjectivist.  
 
The above Davidsonian argument in some sense targets (3), because it is supposed to 
generalize modally. Thus it even covers all possible reflexive epistemic evaluations. 
This fits well with Davidson’s insistence that all interpretation (linguistic as well as 
																																								 																				
20 Davidson 2001, 170. 
21 In a famous passage Davidson submits: ”Making sense of the utterances and behavior of others, even 
their most aberrant behavior, requires us to find a great deal of truth and reason in them. To see too 
much unreason on the part of others is simply to undermine our ability to understand what they are so 
unreasonable about. If the vast amount of agreement on plain matters that is assumed in 
communication escapes notice, it’s because the shared truths are too many and too dull to bear 
mentioning.” Davidson 2001, 153. I here take it that “agreement on plain matters assumed in 
communication” implies that sincerity as well as truth must be assumed.    
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psychological) is at bottom radical linguistic interpretation.22 Thus, for any epistemic 
subject the possible gap between what seems to her epistemically reasonable, and 
what must be seen as in fact epistemically reasonable, significantly narrows, even if 
the concept of epistemic reasonableness involved is not for that reason a subjectivist 
one: If the basic line of thought behind (4) above is right, very often we cannot help 
believing what presently seems to us epistemically reasonable. But the Davidsonian 
argument now assures us that it would be incoherent for us to presume that most of 
those “forced” (hence blameless?) beliefs are not also in fact epistemically reasonable. 
The possibility that such a belief is merely apparently epistemically reasonable is not 
excluded, but should now be regarded as an exotic one, reserved for what is—in 
Davidson’s words—“new, surprising, or disputed”.23 Naturally the same line of 
reasoning applies to all possible interactions between diverse cultures and language 
communities.   
            
Where does this leave us? At the very best, the poverty objection has been somewhat 
mollified. Due to the weakening of (3) necessary to accommodate the points above, it 
can now only saddle DCEJ with problems in the region of the “new, surprising, or 
disputed”, i.e. outside the province of beliefs constituting our “vast amount of 
agreement on plain matters”24. Only here is it possible that a believer irresistibly and 
blamelessly believes on apparently good epistemic reasons, which coherently may 
simultaneously be regarded as really being bad reasons.  So only in such cases will an 
advocate of DCEJ have to concede that some unreasonable beliefs are nevertheless 
justified, because they are blameless. Perhaps this a softer bullet to bite.  
 
But surely proponents of the poverty objection like BonJour will not be satisfied: To 
say that DCEJ has epistemic justification (EJ) right, as long as we stick to a certain 
province of beliefs, invites the problem that the extension of that province here seems 
fenced off by factors entirely contingent and alien to the dispute over our conception 
of EJ. Whether or not the content of a certain belief falls within a domain “new, 
surprising, or disputed” or is part of “our vast agreement on plain matters” is 
determined by historical (psychological and sociological) contingencies, whose 
relation to epistemic goals like truth and knowledge is at best a loose and contentious 
one. So Davidson seems quite a dangerous ally for the deontologist. Also, the basic 
conception of epistemic rationality underlying the argument’s premise (12) is an 
objectivist one.  
 
So the possibility remains very live that a significant portion of a particular subject’s 
beliefs are, due to no fault of her own, simply epistemically irrational (because 
unreliably formed). Again, it seems strange simply to insist that such a very 
unreasonable belief is epistemically justified, just because the believer could not help 
being unreasonable here. So by basically endorsing (2), while only restricting (3) to a 
minority class of beliefs rather than going fully subjectivist, arguably a would-be 
“Davidsonian deontologist” has not really mounted a convincing defense against the 
poverty objection.  
 
Of course there might be other ways to argue from assumptions concerning the 
limited extent of epistemic poverty to the unsoundness of a BonJour-style poverty 
																																								 																				
22 Davidson 2001, 125. 
23 Davidson 2001, 153. 
24 C.f. Davidson 2001, 153.  
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argument apart from those reviewed above. But at present I fail to see any strategy in 
this terrain, which would serve Lockie’s purposes well. This concludes my 
examination of this part of Lockie’s defense.    
 
Lockie on Epistemic Subjectivism and Internalism. 
 
In the opening pages of his article, Lockie focuses more narrowly on what I deemed 
the most promising strategy earlier above, namely a direct attack on (2). Lockie 
submits: 
 
The deontic understanding of justification, plus the ought-implies-can 
principle, leads to the threat of being never able to convict an agent of 
being unjustified, even when he is radically awry, should he or she 
merely be unable to apprehend the fact that he or she is mistaken. The 
solution to this problem for the internalist is to mark a distinction 
between “absolute” and “practical” justification—between fulfillment 
of “objective” and “subjective” duties. To escape the epistemic 
poverty objection, deontic, oughts-based justification must be 
restricted in its application to the “subjective”, “practical” realm.25          
 
Soon after, Lockie writes of epistemic rules or standards that are “subjectively right”, 
and takes the “internalist” position to be that only compliance with such rules is 
relevant to “genuine” EJ.26  But what does Lockie mean by “the subjective realm”? 
Cutting exegetical concerns short, we have already seen above what Lockie needs it to 
mean: A realm of reasons, which does not spawn an appearance-reality distinction 
like (3). For as soon as this distinction is in place, the deontological conception of 
epistemic justification (DCEJ) is in trouble: A reliabilist conception of epistemic 
rationality as was embedded in (2) does the trick, but so, as we shall see below, would 
in fact any other conception, which leaves the advocate of the poverty objection room 
to argue that a believer could irresistibly believe on reasons, whose epistemic 
goodness is merely apparent.  
 
Here it is somewhat unfortunate that Lockie runs together epistemic internalism, 
subjectivism and deontologism. First, by his insistence, evident from the quotation 
above, that the required subjectivism amounts to “internalism” in a standard sense. 
Second, by his claim that such “internalism” has a “deontic core”, for which reason he 
also uses the term “deontogically internalist theories”.27 Neither of those claims, I 
shall now hope to bring out, is felicitous for Lockie’s purposes. 
 
As for the second claim, the problem is this: If (3) could only be undermined by a 
theory of epistemic rationality with “a deontic core”, this would beg the question 
against the poverty objection, whose aim precisely is to dissuade us from accepting 
any such theory. If internalism concerning EJ is to play a part in a convincing attack 
on the poverty objection, surely it must be motivated by reasons independent of 
DCEJ. And perhaps it can be motivated thus. Prominent standard defenses of 
internalism concerning EJ like Conee and Feldman (2008) do not directly appeal to 
deontic concerns. Rather they appeal to intuitive equivalences between allegedly 
																																								 																				
25 Lockie 2015,3. 
26 Lockie 2015,3. 
27 Lockie 2015,4. 
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representative epistemic subjects. The merits of such defenses have been the subject 
of a large and continually blooming literature, which I cannot hope to evaluate or 
review here. Rather, I shall simply grant Lockie that there is indeed a non-circular 
way of underscoring an internalist position concerning EJ in the context of facing the 
poverty objection.   
 
This leaves us with the first problem touched upon above; the relation between 
internalism and the radical stripe of subjectivism Lockie needs in order to combat (3). 
Unfortunately for Lockie it is far from clear that standard internalist positions are in 
fact anywhere near as subjectivist as he needs them to be. Since he seems to favor so-
called access-internalism28, we shall consider that version first. An authoritative 
statement is provided by Robert Audi: 
 
Some of our examples suggest that what justifies a belief—the ground 
of its justification—is something internal to the subject. The internal, 
in the relevant sense, is what we might call the (internally) accessible: 
that to which one has access by introspection or reflection … (…) … 
To have (internal) access to something is either to have it in 
consciousness or to be able, through self-consciousness or at least by 
reflection, whether introspective or directed “outward” toward an 
abstract subject matter, to become aware of it, in the (phenomenal) 
sense that it is in one’s consciousness.29      
 
Shortly put, Audi says here that in order to count towards the epistemic justification 
of a belief, a reason must be internal to the believer’s consciousness, at least given a 
suitable process of reflection. This position is subjectivist in the sense that the 
contents of a believer’s consciousness are subjective phenomena if anything is. But 
the position is not subjectivist in the radical sense Lockie needs: Of course “seemings 
of epistemic reasonableness” are, in the relevant sense, in the believer’s 
consciousness. So, if it seems to a subject that one of her beliefs is epistemically 
reasonable, an access-internalist can allow this “state of seeming”30 positively to 
count towards the epistemic justification of her relevant belief.  Still, the access-
internalist is in no way committed to let such seemings epistemically trump all other 
internally accessible evidence. So even within an access-internalist framework the 
possibility remains very live that a belief is simply unjustified, even if it seems highly 
reasonable to the believer. And there is no immediate reason why the access-
internalist should block this possibility: Surely a believer recklessly following her 
immediate impressions of her own reasonableness without consulting the totality of 
her accessible reasons through careful reflection should hardly count as the paradigm 
of a justified believer. 
 
The upshot is that the poverty objection could easily be mounted on assumptions 
acceptable to a standard version of access-internalism. Since this is a central point, I 
believe it worthwhile to spell this internalist poverty objection out in detail: 
 
																																								 																				
28 Lockie in fact seems to equate ”deontologically internalist theories” with access-internalism. Lockie 
2015,4. 
29 Audi 2011, 272-3. 
30 Not to be confused with a seeming state, of course! 
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14. In order for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing a 
proposition p in some situation C, S’s belief that p must be supported 
by good epistemic reasons for S to believe p in C; 
 
15. [Access-internalist understanding of epistemic reason-goodness] In 
order for a reason to be a good and sufficient epistemic reason for S to 
believe p in C, in C S’s belief that p must be supported by the totality 
of S’s internally accessible evidence; 
 
16. [Appearance-reality distinction] It is possible for an epistemic 
reason to appear good and sufficient to a subject in a situation, even if 
here it is not really a good epistemic reason; 
 
17. There are possible situations and subjects, such that here a subject 
psychologically could not have brought herself not to believe what is 
indicated by reasons that appear to her to be good epistemic reasons, 
even if really believing by those reasons does not here offer the subject 
belief supported by the totality of her internally accessible evidence; 
 
18. [Ought implies can] If a subject S psychologically could not have 
brought it about that X, S has not violated her intellectual duty by 
failing to bring it about that X; 
 
19. ERGO: There are possible situations and subjects, such that here a 
subject is not epistemically justified in believing a proposition p, even 
if she has not violated her intellectual duty by failing not to believe p 
(from 1-5); 
 
20. ERGO: Any theory of epistemic justification implying that 
necessarily, if a subject has not violated her intellectual duty by 
believing p, she is thereby justified in believing p, is false (from 6).   
 
The only revision of the original poverty objection, apart from the replacement of (2) 
with (15) enforced by access-internalism, is the replacement of (5) with (17). But (17) 
seems like something a typical access-internalist should accept due to the possibility 
of epistemic poverty in the form of irreparable cognitive deficiency31: Plausibly some 
believers are simply, due to no fault of their own, simply too dull not often to believe 
by their immediate impressions of their own epistemic reasonableness, ignoring 
contrary reasons easily accessible to them through reflection. In that case, by 
plausible access-internalist standards, they come out epistemically unreasonable and 
unjustified, even if they are blameless. 
 
We may also notice that not even a traditional deontological defense of access-
internalism would be of much help to Lockie (disregarding the problem that arguably 
such a defense would beg the question against the poverty objection). This defense 
goes roughly as follows:32 
 
																																								 																				
31 This is Alston’s preferred term for what many ordinary folk would call plain block-headed stupidity. 
See Alston 1989, 146. 
32 See e.g. Audi 2011, 276. 
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21. [DCEJ] EJ belief equals blameless belief; 
 
22. [Ought implies can] But a subject cannot appropriate be blamed for 
failing to consider evidence, which she cannot access; 
 
23. Only evidence accessible to a subject can count towards her 
justificatory status (from 21 and 22); 
 
24. But no evidence is accessible to a subject unless it is internally 
accessible, i.e. internal to the subject’s consciousness (perhaps 
conditional on suitable reflection); 
 
25. ERGO: [Standard access-internalism] Only evidence internally 
accessible to a subject can count towards her justificatory status (from 
23 and 24). 
 
We may observe here that the deontological “core” assumption (21) only serves to 
limit the domain of what counts towards a subject’s EJ. In no way does it privilege 
specific types of internally accessible evidence to the point of collapsing the 
appearance-reality distinction concerning epistemic rationality.    
 
Lockie does not explicitly consider a shift of allegiance to that other main camp 
within contemporary epistemic internalism; mentalism. However—as should be clear 
by now—such a shift would offer him no improvement. An authoritative short 
statement of mentalist internalism reads: 
 
The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly 
supervenes on the person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, 
events, and conditions.33     
       
Again this position is in no way forced to privilege, among the relevant mental states 
constituting the supervenience base of a person’s justificatory status, her seemings 
concerning epistemic reasonableness. And neither does awarding such privileges 
seem like a very good idea: Plausibly some subject could have among her mental 
states a strong impression of being epistemically justified in believing p, even if the 
totality of her mental states do not constitute an adequate basis for that belief.  
 
I conclude that no standard form of internalism offers Lockie the kind of subjectivism 
he needs in order to undermine the poverty objection. However, his preference for 
access-internalism is hardly a coincidence. A modified version of that position could 
do the trick for him: Above I appealed to a possible subject believing on the mere 
immediate appearance of rationality, too impoverished to take into doxastic account 
the totality of her internally accessible reasons.  
 
In order to make access-internalism sufficiently subjectivist for Lockie’s purposes, we 
need to insist that such agents are impossible. This could be done by significantly 
strengthening the access-condition far beyond what is usually seen in the internalist 
literature: We could insist that even if a reason is accessible, in the standard sense that 
																																								 																				
33 Conee and Feldman 2008, 408. 
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a subject could access it through reflection, it is not accessible in the sense relevant to 
EJ, unless at the relevant time the subject is also able doxastically to respond to it.  
 
Given this modification, the reasons (accessible in the standard sense), to which a 
strongly impoverished agent is unable to respond, are at once no longer deemed 
accessible to her in the sense relevant to EJ. This revised access-internalism would 
give Lockie what he needs: In cases where a subject believes on what irresistibly 
appear to her as being good epistemic reasons, all counter-acting reasons are now (in 
the revised sense) inaccessible to her, hence cannot count against her epistemic 
reasonableness. Lockie now needs the further assumption that in the entire absence of 
contrary reasons, a strong appearance of epistemic reasonableness constitutes a 
sufficient ground for belief. Then, in cases of irresistible belief on apparently good 
reasons, such beliefs are now also really reasonable by definition, since due to their 
inaccessibility no relevant contrary reasons counting against the belief’s EJ remain. 
Finally, then, the appearance-reality distinction is collapsed and (3)/(16) is defeated.  
 
However, this radically subjectivist modification of access-internalism also makes the 
position highly suspect. It now more or less offers a carte blanche for spurious 
excessive epistemic self-confidence. It even serves to underwrite an important 
intuition fueling the poverty objection in the first place, namely that it ought not be 
possible to improve a subject’s epistemic status (more epistemic justification) simply 
by making her epistemically poorer (more block-headed and over-confident, thus 
putting further reasons out of her reach).34 
 
I conclude that even if Lockie is right that a version of access-internalism is the right 
place to look for support against the poverty objection, the specific access-internalism 
he needs is implausible and radically non-standard. I see no strong reason to endorse 
such a position, even for access-internalists. In fact the dialectic could well work the 
other way: If access-internalism does not hold resources credibly to stave off the 
poverty objection to DCEJ, perhaps it ought better rid itself of any remaining “deontic 




Above, I spent some effort regimenting a standard poverty objection to the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ), before evaluating Robert 
Lockie’s recent attacks on that objection. My investigations revealed that neither 
Lockie’s empirical arguments against widespread and asymmetrically distributed 
epistemic poverty, nor his harnessing of access-internalism, did ultimately succeed in 
significantly weakening the poverty objection. I also attempted to bolster and augment 
Lockie’s preferred arguments.  
 
First, I tried to mount a hermeneutical argument against massive epistemic poverty. I 
argued that even if this argument seemed more relevant than Lockie’s empirical 
arguments, ultimately it achieved nothing beyond somewhat mollifying the 
implications of the poverty objection. Second, I argued that a radically non-standard 
access-internalism might in fact yield the radical subjectivism Lockie needs. 
																																								 																				
34 Similar concerns seem to trouble access-internalism even in its more palatable varieties. See e.g. 
Goldman 2009, 323-5. 
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However, not only is it hard to see how such a position could ever be defended 
without simply begging the question against the poverty objection. Also, it seemed 
implausible in its own right.  
 
Where does this leave us? First, we should hardly rule out entirely that the poverty 
objection to DCEJ may somehow be undermined. But even with this objection down, 
DCEJ is not off the hook. As I have argued elsewhere35 it faces a number of other 
pressing objections. One tempting way out at this stage is to give up on the claim 
central to traditional DCEJ that blamelessness suffices for EJ. After all, this is the 
claim targeted by the poverty objection.  
 
If we retreat to the idea that blamelessness is an insufficient, but necessary 
requirement for EJ, that concept would retain a distinctive deontic flavor, while 
dodging the poverty objection altogether. Perhaps surprisingly, Lockie hints at such a 
solution, when he writes that “we are rational … (…) … if we use what we have got 
well, diligently, and to the limits of our ability.”36 Now, the poverty objection is 
precisely that using “what we have got” to the limits of our ability does not always 
amount to using it well enough for justification. But literally, Lockie could be read as 
admitting here that those are two different aspects of epistemic rationality anyway.      
     
Still, even this concession perhaps is not enough: In my opinion (see my 2013), in 
order clearly to stand apart from rival conceptions, DCEJ is forced to understand EJ in 
terms of blamelessness. But unlike EJ, blamelessness is not obviously a graded 
phenomenon. One can be more or less justified in believing a proposition, but either 
one is justly reproachable for believing it, or one isn’t. Also blamelessness is not 
obviously an epistemic notion, neither is it clear how it could be turned into one.37  
 
Arguably, talk of “epistemic blamelessness” makes sense only in so far as epistemic 
concerns may, pro tanto, count towards an agent’s blameworthiness. It makes dubious 
sense to say of a blameless agent that she nevertheless remains blameworthy in some 
specific epistemic sense.38 Rather, if, all things considered, she is not blameworthy for 
holding a belief, this means that she is beyond just reproach for holding it in any 
legitimate sense. If this is right, the relation between doxastic ethics and epistemology 
is at best a contingent one. We should then stop trying to make sense of basic 
epistemological concepts in terms of ethical ones.    
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